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Religious Liberties

Perry v. Schwarzenegger: Is Traditional Marriage Unconstitutional?
By George W. Dent, Jr.*

Note from the Editor:
This article and the article that follows by Mark Strasser provide different perspectives on the main issue at stake in the Ninth
Circuit case Perry v. Schwarzenegger, namely whether California Proposition 8, an amendment to the state’s constitution
providing that a marriage is a union between a man and a woman, violates the U.S. Constitution. We hope that publishing these
articles helps contribute to the debate over this and other challenges to state constitutional provisions. The Federalist Society
takes no position on particular legal or public policy initiatives. We welcome your responses to these articles; to join the debate,
you can e-mail us at info@fed-soc.org.

U

ntil 2000 the legal institution of civil marriage was
understood to be available only to one man and one
woman. In 2000 Californians passed an initiative
statute (Proposition 22) reaffirming that understanding. The
California legislature then enacted a law authorizing domestic
partnerships for same-sex couples that offer the same legal
treatment as marriage under a different name. 1 In 2008
the California Supreme Court nullified Proposition 22 and
construed the state constitution to mandate that marriage be
redefined to be available to same-sex couples.2
At the next opportunity, just five months later, the people
of California approved Proposition 8, which added to the state
constitution: “Only marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California.” The initiative did not affect
domestic partnerships.
Two same-sex couples who were denied marriage
licenses after passage of Proposition 8 sued, challenging its
constitutionality. The Governor, Attorney General, and other
state officials refused to defend the law. Sponsors of Proposition
8 intervened to defend it. Judge Vaughn Walker of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California held
that the intervenors had standing to defend the law and
that Proposition 8 violates both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.3
The defendant-intervenors appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A three-judge panel of that court
heard oral argument on the case in December 2010.4
I. Defendants’ Standing
An initial question is the standing of the defendantintervenors. In Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona5 the
majority opinion by Justice Ginsburg expressed in dictum “grave
doubts” whether sponsors of a ballot initiative have standing
to defend it if elected officials refuse to do so. However, the
purpose of ballot initiatives is to enable voters to enact laws
that government officials refuse to adopt. To deny sponsors of
initiatives standing to defend them would in effect privilege
officials to nullify this democratic process. It is unlikely
that the court of appeals or Supreme Court will allow such
nullification.

.....................................................................
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II. Findings of Fact
In reaching his decision Judge Walker made several
crucial—essentially dispositive—determinations that he
labeled findings of fact. Ordinary findings of fact are reversed
only if found on appeal to be clearly erroneous.6 However,
the legislative and executive branches of government must
constantly make findings of fact in order to formulate and
enforce laws and regulations, and these “legislative facts” cannot
be ignored by a trial court and are not subject to the “clearly
erroneous” standard but to de novo review.
“Legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding
and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data.”7 The burden is “on the one attacking
the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable
basis which might support it, whether or not the basis has a
foundation in the record.”8 The issue, then, is whether the law
satisfies the relevant standard of review, and this is an issue to
be decided de novo by the appellate court, with due deference
to democratic processes.
III. Issues Specific to Proposition 8
All but a few states have laws limiting marriage to one
man and one woman. This suit certainly could have bearing
on all those laws. Hesitant to overreach, the plaintiffs have
struggled to identify particulars to differentiate Proposition 8
from other state laws and thereby narrow the scope (and the
threat) of a ruling in their favor. One such particular is that
Proposition 8 was adopted after the California Supreme Court
mandated recognition of same-sex marriages. Thus, it is claimed,
Proposition 8 differs from other state marriage laws because
it deprived same-sex couples of an existing right rather than
simply withholding a right they never had. However, if a right
is not constitutionally mandated, how can it be unconstitutional
for a state that has granted the right to change its mind and
withdraw it?
In a few cases, the Supreme Court has overturned laws
that withdrew constitutionally-discretionary rights because the
Court found that the laws were impelled by an impermissible
motive. In Romer v. Evans9 for example, the Court struck
down a Colorado constitutional amendment adopted by voter
initiative that withdrew from the state legislature and local
governments the power to enact laws against sexual-orientation
discrimination. The majority said that the law was motivated by
animus—a bare desire to harm—because it was not “directed
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to any identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective.”10
The majority further objected to the law because it amended
the state constitution and thereby precluded those seeking laws
against sexual-orientation discrimination from attaining them
through ordinary legislation.
As the minority pointed out, the very purpose of
constitutional provisions is to erect a barrier against ordinary
legislation. Further, in many states constitutional provisions are
the only laws that can be adopted by voter initiative. Therefore,
to nullify such an initiative in effect deprives citizens of any
power to act on a particular matter, even though the goal they
seek is permissible under the Federal Constitution. Romer seems
to make much of state constitutions unconstitutional.
The minority in Romer also noted that the Colorado
initiative merely overrode local laws that were not constitutionally
mandatory. However, the holding that the initiative had no
“legitimate purpose” seems to mean that there would also be no
legitimate purpose for not having laws against sexual-orientation
discrimination to begin with, which would mean that such laws
are constitutionally mandatory. Neither Romer nor any other
Supreme Court decision, though, has so held.
Moreover, it is easy to find legitimate purposes for the
initiative in Romer. In a free society, people are generally free to
choose with whom to deal, even if others might consider one’s
choices irrational or improper. Discrimination is forbidden only
on a few select grounds. The people of Colorado might plausibly
have believed that discrimination based on sexual orientation is
tolerable or that any problems it creates were not serious enough
to require the heavy burden of government intrusion through
antidiscrimination laws.
One cannot claim that the whole structure of marriage,
recognized by every civilization throughout history, was
contrived solely to harm homosexuals. As discussed below,
it is also easy to find a legitimate purpose for Proposition 8.
However, Romer seems to be a constitutional wild card—a
precedent with no firm meaning that can simply be played
whenever five Justices feel like striking down a law they do not
like but in which there is no constitutional flaw.
IV. Standard of Constitutional Scrutiny
The central issue of Perry is the constitutional validity of
laws restricting legal marriage to a woman and a man. A key
subsidiary issue is the standard of constitutional scrutiny by
which such laws should be reviewed under the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses. All laws create distinctions and
thus treat people unequally, and all laws limit rights either by
forbidding some kind of behavior or by granting benefits for
some persons or conduct and not others. In general, however,
a law satisfies the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses if
the distinctions it makes have a rational basis. As noted above,
this means only that there is some conceivable rational basis,
even if that basis is not found in the record.
However, a few areas—those involving fundamental
rights or distinctions that create a “suspect class”—are subject
to strict scrutiny, requiring the state to show that the law
serves a compelling interest that cannot be achieved by less
discriminatory means. 11 The paradigm category of strict
scrutiny is supposed to be race12 because the Equal Protection

Clause was adopted in the wake of the Civil War to protect
the rights of former slaves who were being reduced to virtual
serfdom by racially-discriminatory laws adopted in the former
Confederate states.
Strict scrutiny is not necessarily fatal to discriminatory state
action. For example, the Court has upheld racial preferences
in university admissions on the factually dubious ground that
racial diversity improves the quality of education.13
A strong argument can be made that traditional marriage
serves a compelling state interest. The family is society’s most
basic institution, and traditional marriage has always been
considered crucial to the successful functioning of the family.
The suffering of children in our neighborhoods where marriage
has lost its prestige and has ceased to be the norm certainly
argues for a compelling need to retain and promote traditional
marriage.
However, strict scrutiny should not be the applicable
standard. The Supreme Court has never applied anything more
stringent than the rational basis standard to sexual orientation.
The Court’s only decisions overturning laws based on sexual
orientation are Romer, where the Court found no legitimate
purpose for the law, and Lawrence v. Texas, which held only that
disapproval of homosexual acts could not be enforced “through
operation of the criminal law.”14 In both Lawrence and Romer
the Court applied the rational basis standard. The Court in
Lawrence said that Texas’s criminal sodomy law “furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.”15 Perry involves no
“intrusion into the personal and private li[ves]” of homosexuals.
The Court in Lawrence said expressly that the case did “not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition
to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”16
The Equal Protection Clause was not intended originally
to protect homosexuality. Lawrence might be defended on
the ground that there had evolved a national consensus to
tolerate private homosexual acts. Most states had repealed their
criminal sodomy laws, and the few remaining laws were rarely
enforced. In effect, these laws had ceased to be expressions
of public morality and had become tools of arbitrary police
harassment. It is not surprising that the Court would find such
laws irrational.
Public attitudes about homosexual marriage are very
different. Even if the meaning of equal protection can change
with public consensus, that has not occurred here. Referenda
on this issue have been held in thirty-one states, and in every
one traditional marriage has been affirmed—usually by a large
margin. Interracial marriage offers an instructive contrast.
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia
(discussed further below), some state courts had struck down
antimiscegenation laws. In none of these states was there a
serious effort to restore the law by ballot initiative.
The Court has sometimes suggested that strict scrutiny
applies to groups with “an immutable characteristic determined
solely by birth.” 17 This could be a very broad concept.
Intelligence, for example, is to some significant extent
hereditary, yet many state actions (like college admissions and
matriculation) discriminate on the basis of intelligence. Even
if homosexual orientation is “an immutable characteristic,”
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traditional marriage is intended to encourage responsible
procreation, a purpose that is clearly irrelevant to homosexual
conduct.
Further, the concept arguably does not apply to
homosexual marriage. First, it is unclear that sexual orientation
is “determined solely by birth.” The American Psychiatric
Association says “there are no replicated scientific studies
supporting any specific biological etiology for homosexuality.”18
In at least some cases sexual inclinations may be influenced by
experience.
Second, the issue in Perry is not sexual orientation but
sexual behavior, which is not immutable. Some cultures have
condoned some forms of homosexual activity,19 and in these
cultures such activity has been more common than in cultures
where that activity is severely condemned. Californians
could reasonably decide that they do not want to encourage
homosexual conduct by honoring same-sex marriages.
Strict scrutiny may also apply to laws that discriminate
against “discrete and insular minorities” that are subject to
widespread discrimination.20 Homosexuals certainly have
experienced discrimination, although there is some question
how widespread this discrimination is now. Unlike AfricanAmericans, for example, homosexuals do not have lower average
incomes than other Americans. California’s authorization of
domestic partnerships with the same legal rights as marriage
and the ability of opponents of Prop. 8 to raise more money
for their campaign than its proponents did show further that in
California homosexuals have significant political influence.
The passage of Prop. 8 alone does not establish that
homosexuals in California are a powerless, oppressed minority
needing constant judicial insulation from democracy. Every
substantive law (and the rejection of every proposal for a new
law) creates winners and losers. Supporters of many causes lose
repeatedly, but not every such group is entitled to the privilege
of strict scrutiny.
Most American marriage laws, for example, exclude not
only same-sex couples, but also marriage of close relatives
(“endogamy”) and marriage of groups of more than two persons
(“polygamy” or “polyamory”). Supporters of these forms of
marriage have not succeeded in any state, nor have they attained
approval of civil unions or domestic partnerships for their
relationships. Most advocates of same-sex marriage (including
the plaintiffs in Perry) have not argued that these groups are
“discrete and insular minorities” whose exclusion from marriage
demands strict scrutiny review, yet it is hard to see why they
(whose practices find more support in other societies than does
same-sex marriage) do not merit as much judicial solicitude as
homosexuals.
This inconsistency points to a more fundamental problem
with the equal protection claim here. All parties in Perry agree
that marriage is a privileged status. Plaintiffs do not challenge
that status; they simply want same-sex couples to be eligible
for it. However, if traditional marriage is unconstitutionally
discriminatory, can any privileged status for marriage be
upheld? The defense of traditional marriage is that it promotes
responsible bearing and raising of children. If that defense is
constitutionally inadequate, what constitutional justification
is there for privileging marriage at all? Proponents of same-sex
marriage do not answer this question.

V. The Fundamental Right to Marry
Judge Walker held that Proposition 8 violates the Due
Process Clause by denying homosexuals a fundamental
right of people to marry as they please. The Supreme Court
has sometimes recognized a constitutional right to marry.21
However, this right has always been limited, and the Court has
never held or even hinted in dictum that the right extended to
same-sex couples.
Same-sex marriage is very different from the cases
where the Court has recognized a right to marry. In Loving v.
Virginia,22 the Court overturned a law forbidding interracial
marriage. However, California does not forbid homosexual
marriage; it simply does not license it, but leaves it as a private
matter. Further, California offers homosexuals all the legal
benefits of marriage, withholding only the label. The Court
has never suggested that there is a fundamental right to the
label “marriage.”
As noted, the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex
couples is only one of several traditional restrictions on marriage.
The parties must be unmarried, i.e., no polygamy. The parties
must not be too closely-related, i.e., no endogamy. And the
parties must be adults, i.e., no child marriage. Unlike the samesex requirement, all these practices have been condoned in many
societies. If there is a fundamental right to same-sex marriage,
a fortiori all the other practices must be permitted. It seems
unlikely that the Supreme Court wants to take such a step.
The fundamental right to marry should mean the right
to enter into a relationship that falls within the traditional
definition of marriage, not to legal recognition of whatever
arrangement some person or group of people wants to label
marriage. The law struck down in Loving was a sharp departure
from the traditional definition of marriage in Western
civilization, which never forbade interracial marriages.23 If
anything, then, Loving is a precedent for adhering to, rather than
nullifying, the exclusion of same-sex marriage because, unlike
interracial marriages, Western civilization has never recognized
same-sex relationships as marriages.
VI. The Case for (Traditional) Marriage
Judge Walker held that the “purported rationales” for
the non-recognition of same-sex marriage “are nothing more
than post-hoc justifications” by Prop. 8’s proponents. As with
his finding that Prop. 8 was motivated by a desire to harm
homosexuals, this conclusion seems to rest on the premise
that the institution of marriage was fabricated in every culture
throughout history for the sole purpose of stigmatizing
homosexuals.
Our society generally leaves adults free to arrange their
own affairs. However, a woman and a man can create children
who cannot protect their own interests. Marriage practices have
varied among cultures in myriad ways. However, whatever else
marriage is about (e.g., caste or property), it has always been
centrally concerned with the bearing and raising of children.
As Bertrand Russell said: “But for children, there would be no
need for any institution concerned with sex. . . . [I]t is through
children alone that sexual relations become of importance to
society.”24
Marriage both memorializes and solemnizes the
relationship of a man and woman and provides the basis for an
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enforceable legal commitment among them and their children.
Marriage both reminds the parties and informs the world that
they have entered into a relationship with responsibilities to
each other and to the human lives they may create. In so doing,
it encourages them to plan for responsible procreation, which
includes not only conception but everything that might affect
children. We know, for example, that married men work longer
hours, commit fewer crimes, and abuse drugs and alcohol less
than unmarried men. In other words, marriage works.
The district court held that “same-sex parents and
opposite-sex parents are of equal quality.”25 It is not clear exactly
what this means or what is the basis for the statement. However,
there have been no studies comparing same-sex parents with
married, biological parents. If the district court’s statement
means that the two are the same, it has no basis in fact. If it
means something else, it is not relevant to the constitutionality
of marriage.
Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that the
finding is inaccurate. Innumerable studies have found the
traditional family to be better for children than families with
a single parent or cohabiting couples. If the district court is
right, then cohabiting same-sex couples are better parents than
cohabiting opposite-sex couples. The district court pointed to
no studies purporting to support such a finding.
Same-sex couples can be allowed to adopt, but adoption
is a legal event, not a biological act as is reproduction. Adopted
children can be better protected through adoption proceedings
and custody regulation than by fitting the square peg of samesex relationships into the round hole of marriage.
The district court declared that “[p]ermitting same-sex
couples to marry will not affect the number of opposite-sex
couples who marry, divorce, cohabit, have children outside
of marriage or otherwise affect the stability of opposite-sex
marriages.”26 The only empirical basis the court gave for
that finding was that recognition of same-sex marriages in
Massachusetts supposedly has not affected rates of marriage
and divorce.
This is not a firm basis on which to brand traditional
marriage as irrational bigotry. First, Judge Walker’s empirical
finding may not be correct. Defendant-intervenors cited
studies showing that divorce rates rose and marriage rates fell
in Massachusetts from 2004 to 2007.27 Similarly, marriage
rates have declined and illegitimacy rates have risen in the
Netherlands since it recognized same-sex marriages.
Further, the Massachusetts law has been in effect only
briefly. More time is needed to determine its long-term effects,
such as whether it will influence the raising of children and
the use of artificial reproduction. Moreover, Massachusetts is a
small state in a large country, in nearly all of which traditional
marriage still prevails. Massachusetts may be atypical. Even its
own residents may consider its law an aberration, not a general
change of the meaning of marriage.
There are also substantial reasons to think that recognizing
homosexual marriage would impair the social prestige of
marriage. At trial both plaintiffs and defendant-intervenors
introduced expert statements that validating same-sex marriage
would radically alter the institution.28 Some gay activists support
same-sex marriage for the express purpose of destroying its
social standing.29
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Recognizing same-sex marriage would transform marriage
from its immemorial function as an arrangement centrally
concerned with children to one primarily for the gratification of
adults. As discussed above, thirty-one states have held referenda
on the issue, and in every one the voters favored traditional
marriage, usually by large margins. It is hard to believe that a
Supreme Court decision branding the majority of Americans
(and, indeed, virtually all human beings who have ever lived) as
irrational bigots because they believe there is something special
about the ability of a woman and a man to create human life
would not diminish public respect for marriage.
Much of the legal benefit of marriage is achieved
through the expressive function of law—the effect of the law
in promoting certain norms by the law’s symbolic support.
Perhaps the esteem for marriage generated by the law’s symbolic
support would be impaired by extending it to intrinsically sterile
relationships, but this esteem may be less impaired if a different
label is used. Whether one thinks that California domestic
partnerships go too far or not far enough in recognizing samesex relationships, that approach is not irrational.
VII. Future Proceedings
If, as expected, the Ninth Circuit panel affirms the district
court’s decision, the defendants could seek an en banc rehearing,
or head for the Supreme Court as quickly as possible. The latter
would set the stage for a Supreme Court hearing and decision
in its 2011-12 Term, thus making the case a potential issue in
the 2012 presidential and other elections.
Conclusion
The Constitution confers no right to legal validation of
same-sex marriage. As Judge Richard Posner has said, “If there
is such a right, it will have to be manufactured by the justices
out of whole cloth.”30 For the Supreme Court to do so would
gravely damage its legitimacy and invite efforts to change the
composition of the Court. However justified the public anger
at the obliteration of traditional marriage, such moves would
create a dangerous precedent. It is hoped that the Court will
not provoke such action.
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